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1 Introduction 
What justifies the judicial review of administrative action and how should such 
review be exercised? These two questions have plagued administrative law 
theorists for many years. One of the most sophisticated attempts in answering 
these questions in recent years has come from David Dyzenhaus. Dyzenhaus 
is clearly one of the foremost administrative law theorists in common law legal 
systems, which justifies a comprehensive analysis of his views. Dyzenhaus 
describes himself as an anti-positivist, proceduralist democrat. He thus chooses 
(and defends) anti-positivism (similar to Lon L Fuller) against positivism; a 
proceduralist approach to legitimacy (similar to Jürgen Habermas and Fuller) 
against a substantive approach; and (social) democracy (similar to Jeremy 
Bentham and Hermann Heller) against liberalism.1 Consistent with this 
approach, Dyzenhaus develops a model of judicial review based on reasonable 
justification, with reference to a theory of democracy which is committed to a 
certain model of the rule of law (similar to Etienne Mureinik). In accordance with 
his theory of democracy, which is at the same time committed to the protection 
of human rights and the legitimacy of the administrative state,2
Dyzenhaus' list of publications is impressive and covers a vast range of topics. 
The focus in this article is on his texts from around 1990, with the emphasis on 
 Dyzenhaus 
proposes a theory of deference as respect when it comes to the application of 
the grounds of review of administrative action by the courts. 
                                            
* I am indebted to David Dyzenhaus who provided me with a list of his publications as well 
as with copies of unpublished articles. I am also grateful to Johan van der Walt and Pierre 
de Vos for comments on a previous draft of this article. Karin van Marle must receive some 
credit for the title. The National Research Foundation and the Research Development 
Office of the University of the Western Cape contributed financially towards the research 
conducted for this article. Remaining errors are my own. 
**  Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape.  
1  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 142. Dyzenhaus does not regard these as rigid opposing 
categories, but as a matter of emphasis. 
2  Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 451. 
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his texts published since the late 1990s. This article can obviously not do 
complete justice to all the nuances of his thought. I hope that it is nevertheless 
accurate enough to give a fair account of his thinking insofar as it relates 
specifically to the judicial review of administrative action.3
 
 In this article I will 
provide a summary and an evaluation, first of Dyzenhaus' theory of democracy, 
and then of his proposed approach to judicial review. My evaluation of 
Dyzenhaus' views on democracy and judicial review will proceed through 
reliance on some of the texts of Jacques Derrida, specifically those that relate 
to justice, democracy and the gift. The aim of this discussion will be to seek 
answers to the questions referred to above that plague administrative law. 
 
2 Dyzenhaus' views on democracy and judicial review 
2.1 A theory of democracy 
The debate between proponents of the ultra vires doctrine and those who 
believe that the common law provides the justification for judicial review has 
mostly taken place from the perspective of legal positivism.4 Dyzenhaus 
contends that the debate suffers from an empty formalism and, furthermore, 
that both sides of the debate agree that judicial review is legitimate as well as 
on the values which should guide such review.5
 
 The problems that Dyzenhaus 
has with the formalistic accounts of the justification of review are that these 
accounts –  
                                            
3  Van der Walt and Botha 2000 Constellations 341 have criticised Dyzenhaus from a 
perspective similar to the one adopted here. The focus of that criticism was, however, only 
of Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 11 and did not relate specifically to Dyzenhaus' views on the 
judicial review of administrative action.  
4  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 145.  
5  Dyzenhaus 2002 NZLR 528. Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 33 furthermore 
argues that the ultra vires doctrine cannot – because of its emphasis on legally constituted 
powers – justify the development of a duty of fairness, the imposition of standards of 
reasonableness, or the intervention of the courts in the face of an ouster clause. The 
problems with the common law approach include that it adopts the view that legislative 
intent is irrelevant to justifying review, whilst acknowledging that judges cannot ignore 
legislation which clearly excludes the application of certain common law values, implying 
thereby that judicial review depends upon and is justified by parliament's silence; 
Dyzenhaus 2002 NZLR 538. 
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• can give no guidance to judges on how to resolve administrative-law 
disputes, apart from prescribing a strict and formalistic conception of the 
separation of powers doctrine: judges have a monopoly on interpreting 
law and the legislature on making law; and 
 
• do not regard the administrative state as a legitimate part of the legal 
order and therefore do not see the administrative state as both bound by 
the rule of law and as a legitimate interpreter and maker of the law.6
 
 
Both camps in the debate seem to favour extensive judicial control over 
administrative bodies for (liberal) political reasons: a judicial grab of power 
because of the perceived illegitimacy of the administrative state. Despite 
assertions to the contrary, formalism thus cannot avoid politics.7 Dyzenhaus 
argues that the justification of review and guidance on how such review should 
proceed can only be found in a political theory of the rule of law.8 Dyzenhaus' 
description of his own position (as an anti-positivist, proceduralist democrat) 
should be viewed in light of his understanding of the debate in legal theory as 
one between three rival conceptions of legal culture which provide different 
(moral) arguments for the legitimacy of the rule of law: a culture of reflection 
(the views espoused by the proponents of democratic positivism), a culture of 
neutrality (liberalism) and a culture of justification (democratic theory).9
 
 
Dyzenhaus finds some common ground for his views in the texts of Jeremy 
Bentham, which, he says, reflects the ideas of positivism, proceduralism and 
(radical) democracy. Bentham advocated the idea that legal institutions should 
be structured in a way which promotes what Dyzenhaus refers to as a "culture 
of reflection".10
                                            
6  Ibid 528. 
 Judicial decisions and the common law did not, according to 
7  Ibid 538-539, 553-554. 
8  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 152. Dyzenhaus' theory of democracy is said to be anti-
positivist because of the connection it makes between law and politics (at 142). As he 
points out, the emphasis on process is ultimately based in political commitments (at 170).  
9  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 33-34; Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 24-25 and 36-38. 
10  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 156-157. Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 36-37 
finds a contemporary version of this conception of legal culture in the work of the 
"Antipodean positivists", Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Jeremy Waldron. The culture of 
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Bentham, qualify as law. Only legislation enacted by parliament, reflecting the 
preferences of the majority, would so qualify. Democracy would thus make 
possible 
 
…the happiness of the greatest number by reflecting as faithfully as 
possible the desires of the political community as a whole.11
 
  
Legislation, furthermore, had to be drafted in the clearest way possible, so as to 
prevent any ambiguities from arising and to allow for judicial deference to the 
will of the legislature. Bentham was critical of the common law and the practice 
of judges to find ambiguities in statutes and thereby imposing their views of 
right and wrong on the legislature. Judicial decisions were to have force only as 
between the parties before the court. Bentham was willing to allow the judiciary 
to find that a law is unjust and to not apply it to the parties before him, without 
this, however, affecting the validity of the law. A legislative committee would 
simply be informed of the problem detected by the judge. To give judges the 
power to invalidate legislation would be undemocratic and contrary to the 
culture of reflection as it would mean that judges could interfere with the 
preferences of the majority.12 Bentham, furthermore, did not have a substantive 
theory of justice as Dworkin, for example, has. Bentham, Dyzenhaus points out, 
wished for substantive principles of justice to emerge through the democratic 
process.13
                                                                                                                               
reflection is "most strongly articulated in the codified European legal orders", Dyzenhaus 
says (at 38). 
 Dyzenhaus agrees with Bentham's idea of legitimacy deriving from 
the people and, therefore, on the central role of the legislature. He is, however, 
critical of Bentham's views in relation to the role of the judiciary. Bentham's 
11  Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 346. Democracy and positive law, Dyzenhaus argues (at 346-
347), are purely instrumental in Bentham's model as they are regarded as the best ways of 
realising a culture of reflection: "Democracy is the best available mechanism for revealing 
preferences and positive law the best available mechanism for implementing them. If other 
superior mechanisms were available, they should be adopted." 
12  Ibid 346, 348. 
13  See Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 157; Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 343-344; Dyzenhaus 
1998 SAJHR 33; Dyzenhaus Recrafting the Rule of Law 2-3, 6; Dyzenhaus Politics of 
Deference 280. 
J DE VILLE  PER/PELJ 2006(9)2 
45/197 
theory of democracy is deficient, he says, for not allowing any control over the 
determination of what law is.14
 
  
In developing a model which addresses the latter criticism, 
Dyzenhaus draws from what he terms "a culture of neutrality", as 
reflected in Dworkin's theory of the rule of law.15 In a culture of 
neutrality, law is used to keep certain principles safe from 
democracy.16 Dyzenhaus has a number of problems with Dworkin's 
theory which are of relevance to judicial review. His first 
disagreement is with Dworkin's idea of judicial supremacism,17 which 
is tied to his formal doctrine of separation of powers.18 Applied to 
administrative law, this idea would effectively mean that judges 
would have the final say with regard to all interpretive issues (both 
procedural and substantive) in reviewing administrative action.19 The 
imperialism of principles in Dworkin's model furthermore creates the 
opportunity for judges to apply private law principles in the public law 
context.20 Because of the distinction between policy and principle, 
judges are also likely to leave an unfettered discretion to 
administrative bodies when a matter is regarded as one of policy.21 
Dyzenhaus nevertheless does not completely reject the idea of 
principles which animate the legal order, as he believes (with 
Mureinik and Fuller) that there are certain coherent principles 
(present in the common law of administrative law) which are 
fundamental to both legal and political order because they are 
essential elements of democracy.22
 
  
Dyzenhaus points out that in South Africa under apartheid, Mureinik argued 
that the legislature, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, should 
be taken to have wished for certain fundamental principles to be protected. The 
legislature should thus be assumed by the courts to have acted coherently with 
the aspirations of the rule of law by complying with certain (legal and moral) 
                                            
14  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 34; Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 170-171; Dyzenhaus 
Recrafting the Rule of Law 7. 
15  According to Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 38 the culture of neutrality is most 
strongly articulated in the legal order of the United States.  
16  Ibid 37. 
17  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 25-27; Dyzenhaus Rule of Law 21 (of draft). 
18  Dyzenhaus State of Emergency 15-16 (of draft). 
19  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 165. See further the discussion under the next heading 
below. 
20  Dyzenhaus Rule of Law 22 (of draft). 
21  Ibid. 
22  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 12; Dyzenhaus Recrafting the Rule of Law 7. 
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principles.23 As will be seen in the discussion that follows, the principles that 
Dyzenhaus adopts as forming part of the inner morality of law (or common law 
values) are more substantive than the eight principles of Fuller.24 Dyzenhaus 
compares this "theory of legislation" with Dworkin's theory of adjudication which 
he finds problematic in the South African context under apartheid. Dworkin's 
theory of law as integrity simply could not work because the moral principles 
Dworkin refers to were not prevalent in the South African legal order due to 
apartheid.25 A theory of legislation on the other hand is more attractive because 
it does not require that a judicial decision fits into certain moral principles to be 
found in the legal order. The principles that are imputed to the legislature in 
terms of a theory of democracy stem not only from the particular legal order, 
but from ideal legal order – the principles or values to which any positive legal 
order must aspire.26 Should these principles be excluded by the legislature, the 
legislation will simply not be law, but an exercise of arbitrary power.27
                                            
23  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 21. Even if it would appear, therefore, as a matter of fact that the 
legislature wanted to give the power to an official to infringe fundamental rights, but this 
was not expressly done, the court should hold that there was no authority to infringe the 
right. See also Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 29: "It is because the 
legislature should be presumed, in the absence of explicit statements to the contrary, to be 
a democratic institution that judges should presume that the legislature intends its 
delegates to act in accordance with fundamental values." 
 If there is, 
24  See Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 255: "My position is one firmly based in Fuller's work on an 
inner morality of law with a Dworkinian twist." Fuller's principles are generality, publicity, 
non-retroactivity, clarity or intelligibility, non-contradiction, possibility of compliance, 
constancy through time and congruence between declared rule and official action (for an 
evaluation of the merits of these principles, see pages 18-21). Dyzenhaus includes 
equality, fairness and reasonableness as rule of law values or principles; see Dyzenhaus 
1994 Ratio Juris 92; Dyzenhaus With the Benefit of Hindsight 79; Dyzenhaus Juristic 
Force of Injustice 371 and 372 (of draft). Dyzenhaus also sees Fuller's principles as 
"instantiations of the more abstract principles of participation and accountability"; see 
Dyzenhaus 2000 OJLS 722. See further below on more recent developments in 
Dyzenhaus' thought on values. 
25  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 16. 
26  See Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 349 (of draft). 
27  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 21-22. There appears to be an inconsistency, an ambiguity or 
perhaps a change in recent years in Dyzenhaus' views as to whether or not in a system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the courts may declare invalid and/or refuse to enforce such 
inequitable laws. See Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 262 where he takes the view that judges 
can "strike such [legislative] decisions down as illegal and leave it up to the legislators to 
find a legal means of implementing their policy objectives". However, at other times he  
takes the view that where Parliament, in a system of parliamentary sovereignty, clearly 
expresses the view that a fundamental right is to be abolished or that the administration is 
to be allowed to act in contravention of a fundamental right (e.g., through the enactment of 
a substantive privative clause), the courts would have little choice but to abide by the 
legislative provisions (Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 368-369 (of draft); see also 
Dyzenhaus Justice of the Common Law 38-39). In some of Dyzenhaus' other publications 
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on the other hand, no explicit legislative provision that allows for the violation of 
fundamental values (for example, a general privative clause or a subjective 
grant of discretionary powers), it should be assumed that the legislature meant 
for these values to be protected.28
 
 
Dyzenhaus is of the view that Bentham would have been critical of the 
administrative state in the same way in which he was critical of the common law 
and the role of judges. This is because of the discretionary powers given to 
administrative officials which Bentham would most likely have found as 
objectionable as he found judicial discretion.29 Dyzenhaus, however, believes 
that redistributive goals can be achieved only through the administrative state.30 
In order to be true to Bentham's legacy, he argues, therefore, that the existence 
and legitimacy of the administrative state should be acknowledged - because of 
its institution by democratic legislatures - whilst at the same time not discarding 
the idea of judicial control completely. Dyzenhaus argues that the existence of 
the welfare state requires a specific attitude from the courts in fulfilling their 
functions vis-à-vis the administration. The administrative state requires of the 
courts a "willingness to permit some measure of autonomy for administrative 
decision-making".31 This autonomy should relate both to the substance of the 
decision and the procedures adopted in coming to that decision.32 As compared 
to the position of judges in Dworkin's law as integrity, a more modest role for 
judicial review is thus envisaged in Dyzenhaus' model.33
                                                                                                                               
he says that the courts should under apartheid have "denounced such statutes for 
illegality" (Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 21; Dyzenhaus Truth, Reconciliation 159; Dyzenhaus 
With the Benefit of Hindsight 80), which appears to leave the matter open. 
 The justification for 
this approach lies in the fact that the legislature (the main institutional actor 
28  Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 252. See also Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 369 (of draft): 
"[T]o the extent that a government is unwilling to make its desire to be unconstrained by 
the rule of law entirely explicit, judges are given toeholds in the law to impose rule of law 
constraints, if they are minded to do so. That is, since such judges operate on the 
assumption that government under the rule of law aspires to realize the values of the 
common law model, they will interpret legislation on the basis that it shares that aspiration 
unless they are forced by very explicit language to abandon that assumption." 
29  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 158. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 288. 
32  Ibid. 
33  In 1991, Dyzenhaus’ Hard Cases seems to still follow Dworkin by favouring judges having 
a monopoly over the interpretation of legislation, however, he did express himself in favour 
of an amber light approach to review (as opposed to a green or red light approach, at 265). 
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within a democracy)34 had chosen the administrative body as the primary 
decision-maker with respect to the issue involved.35 The administrative body 
will also be closest to the problems out of which the issue arises, being able to 
deal with them quickly and cheaply and will often have considerable expertise 
regarding the issue.36 Stated differently, because legislation grants policy 
making and interpretive functions to administrative officials, they should be 
primarily responsible for the exercise of such powers, with judges having only a 
secondary responsibility in this regard.37
 
  
Dyzenhaus refers to his understanding of law as aspiring to justification,38 as a 
democratic theory because it shares with Bentham's idea of law as a culture of 
reflection the idea that parliament has the primary role in making law so that the 
role of judges is one derived from a theory of democratic legislation (rather than 
from a substantivist theory of adjudication). Democracy does not play an 
instrumental role in a culture of justification as democratic institutions are 
believed to be essential to sustain such a culture.39 As pointed out above, the 
legitimacy of a culture of reflection for Bentham resided in the responsiveness 
of the political and legal institutions to legislative reform in the light of citizen's 
experiences of the effects of law.40
                                            
34  See the discussion of Bentham and Habermas in Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 344  
 Law in a culture of justification aims to 
ensure the same kind of responsiveness with regard to all state institutions. 
Law in a culture of justification furthermore shares with the liberal conception of 
law the idea that the judiciary is the guardian of fundamental principles of law. 
These principles are not, however, to be understood as moral principles with a 
fixed content and which need to be met by the legislature and executive for 
35  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 304. 
36  Ibid. Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 477 argues that, unless explicitly excluded by 
Parliament (or the Constitution), the power of tribunals should extend to finding their own 
enabling legislation to be in conflict with the Canadian Charter. This ties in with his theory 
of democracy because "it is before tribunals rather than courts that most people are likely 
to contest their rights". 
37  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 171; Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 24-25, 34; Dyzenhaus and 
Fox-Decent 2001 UTLJ 193. 
38  This notion is derived from the work of Mureinik as well as Fuller's principle of publicity 
which "involves a commitment to a process of reasoned justification by legal authority to 
those subject to it"; see Dyzenhaus Rule of Law 26 (of draft). 
39  Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 347. 
40  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 170. 
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their actions to be valid. In other words, these principles should not be enforced 
by the judiciary to limit the process of democratic decision making.41 These 
principles (identified by Mureinik as participation and accountability)42 can be 
said to be of a procedural rather than a substantive nature and are in essence 
"different institutional ways of articulating the basic principle of democracy".43 
The citizen has the right to participate in decision-making44 and to require that 
the decisions made are rationally justifiable.45 The fact that these principles are 
procedural in nature does not, however, mean that they have no implications 
for substantive decision-making.46 A rigid distinction can thus not be drawn 
between procedure and substance as the one inevitably has implications for the 
other.47
 
  
Whereas in liberal thinking democracy simply fulfils an instrumental role – it has 
to lead to decisions which ensure compliance with liberal political values – 
Dyzenhaus believes that democratic institutions are essential for purposes of 
sustaining a culture of justification.48
                                            
41  Ibid. Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 33-34 points out that in a culture of neutrality the judiciary is 
tasked with the function of ensuring that the state complies with certain (liberal) principles. 
The legislature is not permitted to interfere with these principles. These (neutral) principles 
are, in other words, a safeguard against democracy. Statutes, on the other hand, "are an 
inferior form of law, the transient expressions of majority preference as to government 
policy, legitimate only so long as they do not run up against the judges' understanding of 
the limits of public reason". 
 The idea of individual conscience also 
differs in democratic and liberal theory. Whereas in liberal theory, the 
recognition of individual conscience ultimately means giving a judge the final 
say on whether there has been compliance with liberal political values (and 
thus to an assumption of consensus), in democratic theory the conscientious 
citizen is the guardian of legitimacy. A decision as to civil disobedience under 
the latter model is nevertheless to be taken as a democratic citizen, which 
42  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 170; Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 34. 
43  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 35. 
44  Ibid 34-35. As Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 144 points out, this has certain 
implications for the protection of liberty (similar to the position in liberalism) as a certain 
minimum degree of negative liberty would have to be guaranteed to ensure that the citizen 
can effectively participate in collective decision-making.  
45  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 143, 172; Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 305. 
46  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 144, 170, 172. 
47  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 35; Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 UTLJ 193. 
48  Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy 234, 244, 247-248. 
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means being able to give reasons for disagreement with decisions of the 
majority.49
 
 
The question of legitimacy is on Dyzenhaus' account understood differently in 
different conceptions of legal culture. In a culture of reflection, law is legitimate 
if it reflects the preferences of the majority and where political and legal 
institutions are highly responsive to legislative reform in the light of citizen's 
experiences of the effects of law.50 Liberal theory attaches legitimacy to a legal 
system which complies with the values of liberalism.51
 
 Dyzenhaus, however, 
argues that the legitimacy of the decisions of all state bodies lies in the fact that 
they have to provide (rational) justifications for their decisions. In the words of 
Dyzenhaus – 
The basic principle is that all decisions backed by the public force 
that goes with invoking the authority of "the people" are legitimate 
only if they can be shown to be justifiable.52
 
 
Legitimacy thus follows because law is appropriately produced not because it 
has a particular content.53 Judges, by being required to apply this procedural 
understanding of law are obliged to see themselves as one of the branches in a 
democratic legal order (rather than as a guardian of liberal morality) together 
with the executive and the legislature.54
                                            
49  Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 347. See further Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy 254 (see 
also at 212-213): "The democratic citizen, faced with a clash between positive law and the 
dictates of his conscience, accords proper weight to the law in deciding how to resolve the 
clash. And that requires taking into account his democratic responsibilities, including the 
responsibility to attend to the extent to which the law is the product of a properly 
functioning democratic legal order." See also Dyzenhaus 1996 OJLS 659-661. At 662 
Dyzenhaus points out that for Heller (and Dyzenhaus appears to agree with this sentiment) 
the ethical right of resistance is "meant more to ensure that law is constantly brought into 
line with its own ideal than to provoke actual resistance". 
 This also has implications for the 
entrenchment of fundamental rights. Such entrenchment is essential in a 
50  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 33. 
51  Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy 10. 
52  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 35. 
53  As will be indicated below, Dyzenhaus' notion of justification has recently become more 
substantive in nature, with inevitable consequences for his understanding of legitimacy.  
54  Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy 246; Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 305; 
Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 357: "Judges retain an important role in…[the deliberative] 
process, but one which makes them just part of determining the law. The legislature and 
the administration are not to be seen by judges as enemies of the law but as collaborators 
in determining what law is."  
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culture of justification as it compels legislatures to justify their legislation to 
citizens.55 Judicial review is justified with reference to the role the courts play in 
the web of justification that is required for a liberal democracy to be regarded as 
legitimate. Similar to other state organs, the courts need to justify their 
decisions. In the administrative law context the courts at the same time need to 
ensure that administrative action is justifiable. As opposed to the arguments of 
certain thinkers on the left (arguing against the judicial review of administrative 
action because of its anti-democratic nature),56 Dyzenhaus is of the view that 
the courts have an important role to play in controlling the executive, in light of 
the inability of parliament to do so adequately.57
 
 
 
2.2 The theory of democracy applied: deference as respect 
According to Dyzenhaus,58 the proper approach to review was adopted in the 
Canadian cases of Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New 
Brunswick Liquor Corporation59 ("CUPE") and Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk 
Regional Board of Commissioners of Police60 ("Nicholson"). In CUPE the 
Supreme Court held that judges should not have the last word on all 
administrative interpretations of law, but should sometimes intervene only when 
the agency interpretation is irrational.61 CUPE, Dyzenhaus contends, "involves 
a judicial concession that the executive branch of government has authority to 
interpret the law" as well as a partial "judicial cession of interpretive authority to 
the tribunal".62
                                            
55  Dyzenhaus 1996 ARSP 348. 
 In Nicholson, the court held that in respect of procedural fairness 
56  See Hutchinson 1985 MLR 293; Dyzenhaus 2005 UTLJ 691 on John Willis and Harry 
Arthurs. 
57  Dyzenhaus 2002 NZLR 550. See also at 533-534: "[Parliament] become[s] the body that 
governments of the day use to enact statutes in order to delegate back to themselves the 
authority to make and implement policy in accordance with their political inclinations." 
58  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 288. 
59  Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation 
[1979] 2 SCR 227, hereinafter CUPE. 
60  Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police [1979] 1 SCR 
311, hereinafter Nicholson. 
61  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 290-291; Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 493-495, 
however, criticizes the court in CUPE for maintaining the jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional 
distinction, which meant the retaining of a correctness standard of review. 
62  Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 456. 
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a court could intervene also where the decision is administrative (and not only 
when it is (quasi-)judicial) in nature, and that the requirements of fairness would 
depend on the context of the case. All administrative bodies, and not only 
courts and administrative bodies that are court-like, were thus held to be 
subject to the legal value of fairness.63 Nicholson and CUPE, according to 
Dyzenhaus, thus both recognise the inherent rationality or at least potential 
rationality of the administrative process as well as a degree of autonomy to the 
administrative state in the legal order.64 These decisions were followed by the 
decision of the Supreme Court in International Woodworkers of America Local 
2-69 v Consolidated Bathurst Packaging Ltd65 where the court effectively held 
that deference may be appropriate in respect of the procedure decided on by 
an administrative authority. The above approach stands in contrast to the 
Diceyan approaches adopted by the courts in terms of which either all 
questions of law have been regarded as jurisdictional and therefore subject to 
judicial control (thus leaving no room for deference to administrative decision-
making) or where a distinction was made between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional issues (the latter being seen as a realm of politics (arbitrariness) 
and, therefore, beyond legal control).66 Underlying this approach is a deep 
antagonism to statute law and to the administrative state as interfering with the 
private order of the common law.67 Dyzenhaus argues that by recognising the 
inherent or potential rationality of administrative decision-making, a limit is at 
the same time laid down, entitling the courts to interfere whenever the decision 
does not meet the standard of rationality. A standard of rationality, however, 
creates a risk that judges will simply impose judicial standards of rationality on 
the administration.68
                                            
63  Ibid 496-497. 
 In other words, judges could use the language of 
reasonableness although they were ultimately judging the correctness of the 
64  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 289. 
65  International Woodworkers of America Local 2-69 v Consolidated Bathurst Packaging 
[1990] 1 SCR 282. 
66  Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent 2001 UTLJ 198-199. 
67  Ibid 205-206. 
68  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 289. 
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decision of the administration.69
 
 Law understood as a culture of justification 
opposes such an approach. 
As indicated above, in accordance with the understanding of law as a culture of 
justification, it is required of all state organs to be able to justify their decisions. 
Whereas at first Dyzenhaus was non-committal as to whether the common law 
should include a duty to furnish reasons on administrative bodies,70 after the 
decision in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)71 he 
strongly supports the existence of such a duty where important interests are 
affected.72 The courts, in reviewing administrative action, would in accordance 
with this model not be entitled to review administrative action (for unlawfulness, 
procedural unfairness and unreasonableness) on a standard of correctness, but 
simply (with reference to the reasons provided by the authority) to ascertain 
whether the decision can be said to be justifiable or defensible.73 Asking 
whether a decision is justifiable is also different from asking whether a decision 
is justified. In the latter event the question would be similar to a standard of 
correctness, namely whether the decision coincides with the decision which the 
judge would have given herself.74
 
  
The requirement of "adequate justification" entails an approach of deference to 
the decisions of administrative authorities, but then a specific kind of deference 
which Dyzenhaus describes as "deference as respect": 
 
Deference as respect requires not submission, but a respectful 
attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support 
of a decision, whether that decision be the statutory decision of the 
                                            
69  Ibid 292. 
70  Ibid 304 n 63. 
71  Baker v Canada (1999) DLR (4th) 193 (SCC). 
72  Dyzenhaus (ed) Baker 7. Dyzenhaus, following David Mullan, has argued that this duty is 
based on the inherent dignity of the individual; see Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 134.  
73  Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 27-29. 
74  Ibid 27. 
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legislature, a judgment of another court, or the decision of an 
administrative agency.75
 
  
This principle (of deference as respect) Dyzenhaus argues, is the only principle 
which can rearticulate the proper relationship between the legislature, 
administrative agencies and the courts.76 Judges are no longer to have an 
interpretive monopoly insofar as law is concerned.77 This means the complete 
abandonment of the correctness standard that has hitherto prevailed with 
regard to issues of lawfulness and procedural fairness.78 It is important to note 
the shift in traditional thinking that is proposed by Dyzenhaus. Whereas judges 
in common law countries usually ask with respect to lawfulness and procedural 
fairness whether the decision was such, by looking at the decision to see 
whether it complies with the statute or the common law, the question in terms of 
his model would be whether the decision is justifiable (in respect of statutory 
interpretation and the procedure followed) and would focus on the reasons 
given for the decision and not only on the decision itself.79 Dyzenhaus argues 
that the court, in every case, should take the reasoning of the tribunal seriously 
or, stated differently, give independent weight to the tribunal's reasoning.80  
Nevertheless, it requires close scrutiny of such reasoning.81
 
 What the court is 
primarily required to do is 
                                            
75  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 286. The highest courts in both Canada (see Baker v 
Canada at par [65]) and in South Africa (see Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs at par [46] n 32) have adopted this terminology. 
76  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 303. Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 25 n 33; Dyzenhaus 2002 
Queen's LJ 450 opposes a formal vision of the separation of powers which rigidly 
distinguishes (in as far as it is practically possible) between the different functions of the 
legislature (making law), executive (implementing law) and judiciary (interpreting law). The 
democratic model proposed involves a dialogue not only between the courts and 
parliament, but also between the executive and the courts (487).  
77  As Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 463 points out, under the Diceyan model, tribunal 
expertise is restricted to fact-finding and under the Dworkinian model, to issues of policy; 
see Dyzenhaus Rule of Law 21 (of draft). 
78  Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 452-453; Dyzenhaus Mullan's Theory 20 (of draft). 
79  Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 6; Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 493. The 
pragmatic and functional approach of the Canadian courts does correspond to some 
extent with Dyzenhaus' proposal. 
80  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 302. 
81  Ibid. 
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…to find the reasons that best justify any decision, whether 
legislative, administrative or judicial.82
 
  
The court should, in other words, also be prepared to supplement the reasons 
that the tribunal gave for its decision if they are defective.83 A court is not 
allowed to intervene if it would have reached a different decision or if there 
could reasonably have been another resolution of that issue, but only if the 
decision reached (whether in relation to fact or law) is not reasonably 
supportable.84 Even if the issue before the court is a case of statutory meaning, 
the question is not what, in the view of the court, is the correct interpretation of 
the statute, "but whether the reasons offered by the tribunal justify its 
decision".85 The position is the same where fundamental rights are at stake.86 
Even though the standard of review can vary depending upon a consideration 
of a range of contextual factors,87 a correctness standard would not be 
appropriate even where the decision affects fundamental rights.88
 
 
Although Dyzenhaus' basic theory of review has not changed dramatically 
since his 1997 article on "The Politics of Deference",89 the decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Baker v Canada,90 where his notion of "deference 
as respect"91 was adopted, has had a clear effect on his thinking. International 
human rights norms and the need for their compliance now play a dominant 
role in his model of review.92
                                            
82  The similarity with Dworkin's theory of law in terms of which judges are required to make 
the laws of their jurisdiction the best they can be (see Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 25), should 
be obvious. 
 In his more recent writings, Dyzenhaus thus relies 
83  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 304. 
84  Ibid. See also Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 495. 
85  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 303. 
86  Dyzenhaus Mullan's Theory 26-29 (of draft) argues that the fact that a right is not protected 
by the Canadian Charter should not mean that a less stringent standard of scrutiny is 
applicable. He points out that an argument to the effect that where constitutional rights are 
at stake a more stringent standard of scrutiny is automatically applicable, remains within 
the strictures of formalism. All administrative action is constitutional in nature (35). 
87  Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 6. 
88  Ibid 29. 
89  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference. 
90  N 71. 
91  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 286. 
92  In his earlier work of a more theoretical nature (e.g. Dyzenhaus 1996 OJLS 661-664), a 
broad conception of values is also sometimes present, but this broader conception of 
values has, on my reading, only recently be translated into his thinking on judicial review. 
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on a broader conception of values than liberty and equality. These values are 
also more extensive than the principles of fairness, reasonableness and 
equality, or the principles of "participation and accountability" which he relied on 
earlier.93 These "societal" values,94 in which human dignity plays a central 
role,95 are said to derive from a Bill of Rights, the common law and international 
human rights law96 which are to be used to solve all interpretive issues.97
 
 In 
Baker, the majority of the court relied on the International Convention for the 
Rights of the Child (a ratified, but unincorporated treaty) in evaluating the 
reasonableness of the decision of an immigration officer not to allow a 
departure from the normal rule regarding applications for permanent residence 
status (that these had to be made from outside Canada) to Ms Mavis Baker, on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The court concluded, with reference 
to the Convention (which required that the best interests of a child must be 
given primary consideration in all decisions by administrative bodies), that the 
rights of Ms Baker's four Canadian born children had not been given sufficient 
weight in coming to the decision.  
The conception of separation of powers that is proposed by Dyzenhaus entails 
that not only a constituent assembly and the legislature (as would be argued by 
democratic positivists), but also the executive, the courts, international actors 
and parties who challenge administrative decisions, have an important role to 
play in the determination of the values or principles that are considered 
fundamental to a specific society.98
                                            
93  Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 264. 
 In ascertaining whether a decision is 
justifiable, Dyzenhaus proposes that the notion of interpretive charity (which is 
similar to the notion of deference as respect) should find application. This 
principle  
94  Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 29; Dyzenhaus (ed) Baker 1. 
95  Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 161. 
96  Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 488-489, 491.  
97  Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 25-27; Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 499-500; 
Dyzenhaus Mullan's Theory 35 (of draft). These values are in other words not only to be 
taken into account to resolve issues of ambiguity, but also to structure discretionary 
exercises of power and interpretive issues involving open-textured language (such as the 
public interest, reasonableness, etc). 
98  See Dyzenhaus (ed) Baker 4-5; Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 453 (see also at 451 and 
501).  
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…presumes that officials are operating in accordance with 
fundamental legal values, so that it is possible for them to justify their 
decisions in terms of those values.99
 
  
The principle of separation of powers, Dyzenhaus contends, is only useful 
insofar as it serves the project of achieving fundamental legal values or 
principles.100
 
  
 
3 Evaluation of Dyzenhaus' theory of democracy 
3.1 Law and justice 
As can be seen from the above, Dyzenhaus sees a close relationship between 
justice and law. He draws a distinction between the values of the common law 
which have existed from time immemorial, on the one hand, and our 
understanding or judges' interpretation of what those values are on the other. 
The fundamental values of the common law are said to express the notion of an 
"ideal legal order", an "inspirational ideal" or an ideal of justice, and these 
values are said to not have been "created" or "legislated" at any particular 
moment in time.101 Dyzenhaus also refers to his view on the relationship 
between law and justice/morality as a conception of the rule of law which 
involves the enforcement of an "internal morality of law".102
                                            
99  Dyzenhaus, Hunt and Taggart 2001 OUCLJ 29. Dyzenhaus elaborates as follows on the 
nature of the principle of interpretive charity: "At one level, the principle is procedural in 
nature, since it does not tell officials what result to reach, but rather, that relevant values 
have to be demonstrably taken into account or given weight in deciding on the result. But 
the principle does have substantive effects since it will necessarily limit the range of results 
open to the official to those she can show to be consistent with the values, given the 
particular context." 
 The understanding 
100  See also Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 162. Some of the 
consequences of Dyzenhaus' model are that the executive has a legitimate role in the 
interpretation of law (including a Bill of Rights) as well as in determining the application of 
certain values, e.g., by ratifying international human rights treaties or by adopting policies 
which the courts would then be able to enforce in judicial review applications as, e.g., in 
Baker v Canada n 71; see Dyzenhaus 2002 Queen's LJ 487; Dyzenhaus (ed) Baker 16. 
101  Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 349 (of draft). 
102  Ibid at 343. 
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of values evolves and can consequently change significantly over time.103 Any 
specific legal order will only partially manifest the values of ideal legal order.104 
The enactment of a Bill of Rights does not change things fundamentally in 
relation to fundamental values. A Bill of Rights will, similar to common law 
values, not be regarded as a definitive or exhaustive statement of fundamental 
values and it will require constant updating.105 Any interpretation of positive law, 
for example of a statute that grants discretionary powers to an administrative 
official, must give attention both to the values that have become concretised 
within a specific society and to the values of ideal legal order.106 Interpretation 
thus also involves an "update" of fundamental legal values where account 
should be taken of a Bill of Rights, international human rights treaties and 
domestic human rights statutes.107
 
  
There is no doubt much of value in this conception of justice. Judicial review, 
seen in this light, is about more than the simple application of legislation by the 
judiciary in accordance with the intention of the legislature or the literal wording 
of the statute. The judiciary, as we saw above, has to ensure that such 
legislation is interpreted in accordance with fundamental democratic values, 
which include those which have received the stamp of approval of the 
international community. There are, nevertheless, clear limits to this conception 
of justice. This is not because of its primarily procedural nature,108
                                            
103  Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 139. 
 but because 
of its restrictive nature both insofar as process and substance is concerned. 
The notion of an (aspirational) ideal means that justice remains restricted to 
that which is possible for a community to give. Justice understood as values 
always returns to the self, to the community, also when the values are those of 
the global community (especially insofar as it is presently characterised by neo-
liberalism). Community in turn refers to a fortified city, a sharing within a 
circumscribed group and an exclusion of everyone else: cum: "common"; 
104  Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 350 (of draft). See also Dyzenhaus With the Benefit 
of Hindsight 85: "[I]t is not that we should ever expect that the justice of the law will be 
better than imperfect – perhaps highly imperfect – justice." 
105  Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 350-351 (of draft). 
106  Ibid 349. 
107  Dyzenhaus Juristic Force of Injustice 349, 355 (of draft). 
108  Dyzenhaus' notion of justification comes very close to being substantive. 
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munis: "defence".109
 
 It is specifically in matters that deal with immigrants, 
"terrorists" and the economy that these values show their own limits. 
Dyzenhaus' notion of justice as an ideal, in the words of Derrida –  
…remains in the order of the possible, an ideal possible that is 
infinitely deferred. It partakes of what would still fall, at the end of an 
infinite history, into the realm of the possible, of what is virtual or 
potential, of what is within the power of someone, some "I can", to 
reach, in theory, and in a form that is not wholly freed from all 
teleological ends.110
 
 
Dyzenhaus' model of review, furthermore, remains within the order of a 
restricted (albeit progressive) politics. Although it asks of us to be critical of our 
own values as they are always in (progressive) flux, it makes no attempt to 
transcend these values or (communal) subjectivity.111 These values are limited 
and preserve to a lesser or greater extent the interests of property owners. 
Reasonable justification will almost inevitably amount to the reasoning of the 
right-thinking bourgeois, the reason of the strongest.112 Remaining within the 
order of restricted values furthermore necessarily leads to the neutralisation in 
advance of the event (the arrival of what or who comes).113 Dyzenhaus' 
conception of justice (limited insofar as equality, freedom and dignity as well as 
fairness and reasonableness are concerned), also reveals a measure of 
complacency, a lack of urgency with regard to injustice, as well as a limited 
sense of responsibility.114
 
  
A model of judicial review which has a concern for justice, a model which really 
wants to serve all those who are affected by the law (and not simply 
citizens),115
                                            
109  See Gutting French Philosophy 309. 
 a model of justice which is not restricted simply to "our" justice, has 
to take note of Derrida's analysis of law and justice. Dyzenhaus' views show a 
110  Derrida Rogues 83-84. 
111  See further n 152 below. 
112  Derrida Rogues 64, 69. 
113  Ibid 128, 143. 
114  Ibid 84-86; Borradori Philosophy in a Time of Terror 134; Derrida Negotiations 242. See 
further below. 
115  See Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 129-130, 139. 
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degree of correspondence with,116 but must also be clearly distinguished from 
Derrida's analysis of justice. Derrida insists, contrary to Dyzenhaus, on the 
irreducibility of justice to law. Justice, like other normative concepts (such as 
forgiveness, hospitality, and the gift), shows an internal contradiction, a paradox 
or a double bind, Derrida contends.117 On the one hand, justice as law refers to 
the legal rules and values of a legal order. These rules and values are always 
ultimately without foundation. Their institution through an originary or founding 
violence is neither legal nor illegal as they could not have been authorised by 
any legal power.118 They are instituted through violence and maintained 
(enforced) by means of violence or at least the threat of violence.119 On 
Derrida's analysis, law (even if it is understood as including democratic values) 
cannot be equated with justice as law (apart from its violence) inevitably 
involves calculation and generalisation whereas justice requires asymmetry and 
singularity.120 At the same time, justice and law cannot be absolutely 
separated. Justice would be ineffective without law, without enforceability.121 
The major difference between the views of Dyzenhaus and those of Derrida 
comes to the fore insofar as Derrida's views of justice tie in with Levinas's 
ethics of the other.122
                                            
116  See McCormick 1999 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 117-118 
who favourably compares Dyzenhaus' criticism of judges under apartheid with Derrida's 
views on law and justice. 
 What Dyzenhaus regards as justice (an ideal of legal 
order, or values which are internal to law), would simply be law, albeit a fairly 
117  Derrida Passions 9. 
118  Derrida Force of Law 6, 13-14, 31, 35. 
119  Ibid 6: "The word 'enforceability' [of the law] reminds us that there is no such thing as law 
(droit) that doesn't imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of the concept, the 
possibility of being 'enforced', applied by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are not 
enforced, but there is no law without enforceability and no applicability or enforceability of 
the law without force, whether this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior 
or interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive or regulative, and so 
forth". 
120  Ibid 17, 22. 
121  Ibid 10-11, 22. As Derrida 1999 South African Journal of Philosophy 284 has explained in 
an interview: "When I said that there is a difference, a heterogeneity between justice and 
law, I would add this point, which I think is decisive: this distinction is not a distinction 
between two terms, between two poles, as if we had on one side justice, and on the other 
side law. No, they are two, but they are one. It is impossible to think justice without 
including in it the injunction to determine justice by the law, that is, to produce just laws. 
These two poles are infinitely heterogeneous, but the law must be inspired by justice, it is 
part of its concept, and justice must command the production of determined laws. So they 
are linked, they are indisassociable: infinitely different, yet indisassociable." 
122  See Derrida Force of Law 22. There are, however, also important differences between 
Derrida and Levinas on the question of justice. See further n 164 below. 
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progressive law, in Derrida's analysis. Justice, for Derrida, as said above, is 
concerned with singularity and uniqueness, with the infinite alterity of the other 
as other,123
 
 and therefore a responsibility without limits; an incalculable justice 
with no concern for the self.  
Why does Derrida insist that we understand justice thus? How can he make 
such a claim? Derrida's analysis of justice and law is closely related to the 
(non)concept or (non)word, which is124 also not a "thing",125 of différance. 
Différance (a neologism from the French différer: "to differ" and "to defer") 
names that which sets us in motion.126 Derrida, in drawing upon the major 
philosophical insights inscribed within our "epoch", names différance as the 
origin-without-origin of the reserve that is constituted as a result of the 
postponement of a loss of sense, of an investment without return, an 
expenditure without reserve. These insights are inter alia those of Saussure, of 
language as a system of differences without positive terms;127 Nietzsche and 
Freud's questioning of the certitude of consciousness; Heidegger's ontological 
difference (the difference between Being and beings); Levinas's trace and 
relation to the other as other;128 and Freud's death drive.129
                                            
123  This terminology of "the other" is bound to raise questions. Who is the other? Is every 
applicant in review proceedings an other, or only those who are marginalised? Although it 
is tempting to do so, one should not attempt to identify in advance who "the other" is. 
Identifying the other beforehand would detract from her otherness and turn her into "the 
same". To avoid this, the "approach" that is proposed here is closely tied to language and 
the concepts we use in (administrative) law, such as responsibility, decision, democracy, 
equality, dignity, freedom and justice. The proposed approach entails the questioning and 
analysis of these concepts, thereby opening administrative law to the future, a future which 
must be "more just". "The other" should thus be understood as not necessarily a person or 
an applicant for review, but as the new arrivant: that which or who arrives unexpectedly 
and demands justice. The proposed approach, insofar as it speaks of "the other", should 
thus be understood as one of hospitality toward the event of the coming; see Derrida 
Aporias 33-34. The proposed approach is aligned with a left politics, but as will appear in 
what follows, it seeks to go beyond the limits of politics. 
 Différance can be 
124  "Is" is under erasure because différance never presents itself as such; Derrida Speech and 
Phenomena 134. 
125  Ibid 130, 134. 
126  The "a" in différance points to the simultaneously active and passive "generative 
movement in the play of differences"; Derrida Positions 24. Différance is not simply active 
because it is not set in motion by an agent or a subject, yet it is not simply passive; Derrida 
Speech and Phenomena 137. 
127  Saussure pointed out that the language system has no positive terms, but that it is simply 
and only made up of differences.  
128  See, e.g., the interview with Levinas in Mortley French Philosophers 16-17: "When I talk 
about responsibility and obligation, and consequently about the person with whom one is 
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said to imply two logics: (1) of delay, detour, or postponement of desire (of 
death, an expenditure without reserve) or which carries it out in a way which 
tempers or annuls its effect130 and (2) of heterogeneity, alterity, or the other.131 
Différance is the condition of history, of language, of tradition, of beliefs, of 
practices, of institutions, of politics, of ethics, of law, as postponement of 
desire.132 Différance is, therefore, always already inscribed within justice as 
law: law entails a postponement of desire, of incalculable justice. Justice 
cannot, therefore, simply be equated with law or values. Différance also 
underlies Dyzenhaus' model of judicial review. It is only by suppressing the 
effects of différance that his model can find its place in legal discourse. In other 
words, Dyzenhaus' model of review seeks to protect the law and thus also the 
community that law seeks to protect, from that which makes it possible: justice, 
the excess of the un-economic; it seeks to place limits on the infinite 
responsibility that is owed to the other; it is an attempt to erect a barricade 
against the future.133 It is, therefore, not simply an "inner morality" that is 
inscribed in law as contended by Dyzenhaus, but a promise of incalculable 
justice; a justice which calls for revolutionary change, not simply the slow 
evolution of the values of liberal democracy.134
 
 
A judge is typically caught in an aporia, a double bind. She has to do justice 
which, as we saw above, has to do with singularity and incalculability and she 
                                                                                                                               
in a relationship through the face, this person does not appear as belonging to an order 
which can be 'embraced' or 'grasped' [in the way in which objects and things can be 
grasped]. The other, in this relationship of responsibility, is, as it were, unique: 'unique' 
meaning without genre. In this sense he is absolutely other, not only in relation to me; he is 
alone as if he were the only one of significance in that moment. The essence of 
responsibility lies in the uniqueness of the person for whom you are responsible…. 
Furthermore, the 'I' which finds itself with this responsibility cannot be replaced. 
Consequently, within this exceptional relationship between me and the other, he who is 
responsible is the chosen one. It's the uniqueness of the elect. So, apart from what we 
called mind at the beginning, the mind which knows and embraces, which invests, which 
possesses, uses, which takes, understands – all this activity of the mind is in complete 
contrast to the idea of the self which is passive, under obligation and unique."  
129  Derrida Speech and Phenomena 130. 
130  Ibid 136. 
131  Ibid 136-137; Derrida Hospitality 77. 
132  Derrida Hospitality 77; Caputo Prayers and Tears 12. 
133  Derrida Eyes of the University 153. 
134  Contrast Dyzenhaus who says expressly that he does not see judges as revolutionaries; 
Dyzenhaus Hard Cases 268. 
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has to apply the law.135 She cannot however do justice without violating the law 
and she cannot apply the law without violating justice.136 Justice, if it exists, is 
not inherent in law, although justice needs law and laws need to be just. Justice 
is also not a distant horizon, a regulative idea or goal which we attempt to get 
closer and closer to, as it is for Dyzenhaus, but of what is needed here and 
now.137 Because justice needs law, justice (which Derrida also refers to as an 
experience of the impossible)138 can be referred to as the possibility of the 
impossible.139 Justice is the reason for law (makes it possible), whilst at the 
same time being the impossible. Dyzenhaus' neo-naturalism is clearly to be 
preferred to positivism (with its primary values of certainty and stability)140 as 
his model comes closer to justice understood as un-economic excess, an 
expenditure without reserve. But justice for Dyzenhaus is still too closely related 
to and too complacent about the (evolving) values of liberal democracies. 
Dyzenhaus' model of review enables judges in review proceedings who follow 
his model to have a good conscience; to believe that they have done their duty 
by measuring administrative action against the requirement of reasonable 
justification.141 Measuring reasonable justification against the democratic 
values of the common law (those values which are a natural part of law)142
                                            
135  Derrida Force of Law 16 states it thus: "Every time that something comes to pass or turns 
out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a correctly 
subsumed example, according to a determinant judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) 
may find itself accounted for, but certainly not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the 
element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires 
us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as 
improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the 
decision between just and unjust is never assured by a rule." 
 also 
makes it easier to justify the violence that is to be imposed in furtherance of 
136  See also Caputo Against Ethics 89-90. 
137  Derrida 1999 South African Journal of Philosophy 282; Caputo Against Ethics 105; Caputo 
What do I Love? 306; Caputo Prayers and Tears 170. 
138  Derrida Force of Law 16. 
139 The impossible, for Derrida, is something we can think and desire and which motivates us, 
but which we cannot know. The impossible is not the opposite of that which is possible; it 
is not something negative; it is not that which is not possible. The impossible (justice, the 
gift, hospitality, forgiveness, etc) is in a sense one with that which it (the impossible) 
makes possible; see Derrida 1999 Fragmente 40-42; Caputo Deconstruction 133. 
140  Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 161. 
141  Derrida Specters of Marx 28. 
142  See Dyzenhaus 2005 Law & Contemporary Problems 162. 
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these goals.143
 
 Dyzenhaus' approach, in the words of Cornell (criticising 
Stanley Fish) 
…allows the identification of justice with law and with the 
perpetuation of the 'current' legal system.144
 
  
The incalculability of justice can also be understood with reference to the gift.145 
The gift,146 similar to the other normative concepts Derrida analyses (such as 
forgiveness147 and hospitality)148 is pulled in two directions at once. On the one 
hand, the gift gives rise to indebtedness, to an obligation to reciprocate, usually 
within a certain time-period.149 "Gifts" thus tend to create a circular economy. A 
gift in a sense thus cancels itself out as soon as it is given. On the other hand, 
the gift evokes the idea of non-reciprocation.150
 
 As Derrida says,  
[f]or there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to 
give me back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift, 
                                            
143  Derrida Force of Law 32. 
144  Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 159. 
145  See also Derrida Force of Law 25: "This 'idea of justice' seems to be irreducible in its 
affirmative character, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without 
recognition of gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, 
without reason and without rationality." 
146  See Derrida Given Time. For an excellent analysis, see Caputo Deconstruction 140-151. 
147 Derrida On Forgiveness 53 responded as follows to a question on his use and 
understanding of what he refers to as "quasi-concepts" (such as justice, hospitality, the 
gift, forgiveness): "What, then, regulates my use of the word forgiveness?.... I can know 
what is inscribed in the concept of forgiveness that I inherit, so I work on this heritage. I 
found the word and the concept, and a certain number of conflicts surrounding the concept 
in our tradition, in a number of traditions. This can be the object of knowledge, and from 
within this possible knowledge, I discover this extraordinary excess…. And about this 
excess itself I have no knowledge, and I cannot speak of it in a theoretical fashion. But I 
can nevertheless think – I can think what I cannot know – I can think of a desire to forgive 
beyond economy, or to be forgiven beyond economy. I have a thought of this gracious and 
unconditional forgiveness. I have a thought which is given to me by, or rather through, this 
heritage. Even if nothing can be adequate to this thought, I have the thought or the desire 
of this motion. It is out of this desire or thought, which exceeds knowledge, that I speak, 
that I organize this discourse". 
148  On Derrida's analysis of concepts, see also Caputo, Dooley and Scanlon Introduction 8; 
and Critchley and Kearney Preface xi. This analysis ties in with the understanding of 
language and tradition as containing a promise; see Derrida Remarks on Deconstruction 
82-83; Caputo What do I Love? 298-309.  
149  Even if the receiver of the gift (Y) does not play along (Y may not even say "thank you" or 
may simply never give a gift in return) this would not change the indebtedness of Y. X 
would be in the right: she would be able to congratulate herself on her unselfish behaviour. 
This would be even more so if X is an anonymous benefactor. 
150  As Bauman Postmodern Ethics 57 points out, gifts are usually triggered by benevolence. 
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whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by 
a complex calculation of a long-term deferral or differance.151
 
 
The pure gift, if it exists, would be a gift that does not appear as such: where X 
gives without knowing that she is giving (and thus cannot feel generous) and Y 
receiving without knowing that she is receiving a gift (and thus not being able to 
feel grateful). As opposed to the traditional and logical understanding of the gift 
as related to subjectivity, intention, and agency, the pure gift calls for an 
absence of subjectivity, intention and agency.152 The gift calls for the 
impossible:153 a gift which would not obey the principle of reason;154
 
 a gift 
which would interrupt the circular economy. As subjects, we (similar to 
Abraham, as we will see below), are caught in this paradox of the gift. On the 
one hand, we are caught in the circle, the economy of gift-giving and on the 
other, there is the desire to give the pure gift. Law and justice understood in 
terms of Derrida's analysis of the gift, shows the self-serving tendency of law. It 
shows law's underlying economic structure. A constitutional decision in the 
name of a community, seeks, one can say,   
…through the gesture of the gift to constitute its own unity and, 
precisely, to get its own identity recognized so that that identity 
comes back to it, so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its 
property.155
 
  
                                            
151  Derrida Given Time 12. 
152  Derrida ibid 101 says that the "very idea" of the subject is someone who "never give[s] 
anything without calculating, consciously or unconsciously, its reappropriation, its 
exchange, or its circular return – and by definition this means reappropriation with surplus-
value, a certain capitalization". 
153  Derrida To Forgive 28 similarly says regarding forgiveness that "there is in forgiveness, in 
the very meaning of forgiveness a force, a desire, an impetus, a movement, an 
appeal…that demands that forgiveness be granted, if it can be, even to someone who 
does not ask for it, who does not repent or confess or improve or redeem himself, beyond, 
consequently, an entire identificatory, spiritual, whether sublime or not, economy, beyond 
all expiation even." 
154  Derrida Given Time 156: "The gift would be that which does not obey the principle of 
reason: It is, it ought to be, it owes itself to be without reason, without wherefore and 
without foundation. The gift, if there is any, does not even belong to practical reason. It 
should remain a stranger to morality, to the will, perhaps to freedom, at least to that 
freedom that is associated with the will of the subject. It should remain a stranger to the 
law or to the "il faut" (you must, you have to) of this practical reason."  
155  Ibid 11 (see also at 53-54 on giving). 
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The rule of law (even if understood in a non-positivist, democratic, proceduralist 
way) establishes an economy of exchange, a restricted, self-serving 
economy.156 Law as such (without allowing for its interruption by the other, 
without incalculable justice) lays down an encircling horizon of possibility which 
walls us in and cuts off the impossible.157
 
  
 
                                            
156  We could perhaps at this point remind ourselves of the reason for the development of the 
welfare state model which Dyzenhaus, for commendable reasons, values so highly. This 
was not done for "purely" altruistic reasons, but because of an elite fear of social conflict 
and ultimately revolution; see Offe Modernity and the State 154. 
157  Caputo Prayers and Tears 181. 
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3.2 Abraham, law, justice and the perfect gift 
The position in which a judge typically finds herself in review proceedings, as 
well as the (non)concept différance, can be illustrated with reference to 
Derrida's allegorical reading (reading also Søren Kierkegaard and Emmanuel 
Levinas) of the story of Abraham and Isaac (the akedah).158 Abraham is called 
by God to sacrifice his son Isaac on Mount Moriah. Abraham, the father of faith, 
finds himself in a paradox. On the one hand, there is God, making an absolute 
command. On the other, there is Abraham's son, Isaac, whom he is told to 
sacrifice, as well as Sarah (Isaac's mother). Morality (or what Kierkegaard 
refers to as ethics) forbids Abraham from killing his son. Derrida reads the 
reference to God (and the relationship of Abraham to God) as representative of 
my relationship with the other.159 Sarah and Isaac are seen as representative of 
all others and also of ethics, the community, the law, the nation, the state, 
which would call what Abraham (representative of the self or the judge in this 
instance) is called upon by the other to do, "murder".160 Abraham is bound to 
God with an absolute duty, a duty beyond duty as a form of debt.161
 
 Abraham 
responds to the call of the other by saying "Here I am". Abraham does not ask 
why he has to do what God tells him to do. He obeys.  
Those who have a high regard for morality (and one could possibly include 
Dyzenhaus here, who, as we saw, argues for the inner morality of law) would 
likely react with surprise to the idea that this story should teach us something 
about judicial review.162 The story, if it is to show us anything, would be of the 
importance of morality (values and principles) and the dangers of religion or an 
ethics of singularity.163
                                            
158  See Genesis 22:1-19. In "applying" Derrida's reading to the administrative-law context one 
should be cautious. From Derrida's other texts (e.g., Specters of Marx, Rogues, Derrida 
and Roudinesco For What Tomorrow 47-61), it is clear that this responsibility cannot 
simply be translated as a responsibility of a judge in review proceedings to provide 
incalculable justice to the party who initiates the proceedings. See further n 123 above. 
 On Dyzenhaus' analysis, what Abraham should have 
159  Derrida Gift of Death 78. 
160  Ibid 65. 
161  Ibid 63. 
162  Ibid 64. See also Caputo Against Ethics 11 who describes the Hegelian way of Ethics 
which shows a degree of similarity with Dyzenhaus' inner morality of law. 
163  See also Slangen 2005 Filosofie Magazine 38 on the views of Paul Cliteur in this regard.  
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done, was to follow the inner morality of law. Is there not, however, something 
to be said for following Abraham's path? Derrida reads the akedah as showing 
Abraham's absolute response and unconditional commitment and responsibility 
to the other. Derrida, as said above, wants us to understand the duty we have 
towards the other in a way similar to Emmanuel Levinas (the face of the other 
commanding me infinitely and placing me in a position of absolute 
dissymmetry):164
 
  
Duty or responsibility binds me to the other, to the other as other, 
and ties me in my absolute responsibility to the other as other…. As 
soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my absolute 
singularity enters into relation with his on the level of obligation and 
duty. I am responsible to the other as other, I answer to him and I 
answer for what I do before him.165
 
  
I also cannot know or understand the other. The other is inaccessible to me, as 
secret and transcendent as God.166 Therefore, when asked by Isaac about the 
lamb for sacrifice, Abraham responds without responding (he keeps the secret 
– the silent "a" in différance).167
 
 Derrida contrasts this with common sense, the 
common sense that we can also see in Dyzenhaus' notion of justifiability: 
For common sense, just as for philosophical reasoning, the most 
widely shared belief is that responsibility is tied to the public and to 
the non-secret, to the possibility and even the necessity of 
accounting for one's words and actions in front of others, of justifying 
and owning up to them. Here, on the contrary it appears, just as 
necessarily, that the absolute responsibility of my actions, to the 
extent that such a responsibility remains mine, singularly so, 
something no one else can perform in my place, instead implies 
secrecy. But what is also implied is that, by not speaking to others, I 
don't account for my actions, that I answer for nothing [que je ne 
                                            
164  There are, however, important differences between Derrida and Levinas; see Derrida in 
general Violence and Metaphysics 97-192; Derrida At this very Moment 403-439; and 
Derrida Adieu. One of these is that Levinas does not view the relation between justice and 
law as inherently conflictual; see Caputo Prayers and Tears 205, 207. See also Derrida 
Politics of Friendship 304-305 (on Levinas's language of "fraternity"); Derrida Points 278-
279 (on Levinas and the other as excluding animals); and Caputo More Radical 
Hermeneutics 137 (on Levinas's views on sexual equality and abortion). 
165  Derrida Gift of Death 68. Derrida insists that without such infinite responsibility there would 
be no moral or political problems; Derrida Remarks on Deconstruction 86. 
166  Derrida Gift of Death 78. 
167  See Derrida Speech and Phenomena 132. 
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réponde de rien] and to no one, that I make no response to others or 
before others.168
 
 
Abraham's responsibility towards the other is such that it is not guided by 
reason or an ethics that would be justifiable to others or a universal law.169 
What is required in the unique and singular encounter with the other is thus not 
first of all, justification, but secrecy. Responding to the needs of others and 
balancing the interests of the other with those of others through the law or with 
reference to legal values (responsibility in general), incites us to self-justification 
and, therefore, to irresponsibility in relation to our absolute responsibility.170 To 
justify one's decision in language with reference to reasonableness and values 
(as Dyzenhaus proposes) would thus not entail doing justice. It would merely 
entail a response to others. Through the notion of justification, absolute, 
incalculable and incommensurable equality becomes conditional equality; and 
non-normative, immeasurable dignity becomes normative dignity.171 This, of 
course, does not mean that a responsibility is not also owed to others or that 
we should do without legal rules, principles and values. Calculation and 
rationality (and, through the reduction of uniqueness, betrayal,172 violence and 
injustice) are always necessary in the end because of the responsibility that is 
owed to others.173 This does not detract, however, from the infinite duty that I 
owe the other. The absolute responsibility towards the other can even be said 
to imply a duty of hate towards one's own (family, friends, neighbours, the 
nation, the state, the law).174
                                            
168  Derrida Gift of Death 60. 
 This hatred would not, however, amount to a 
169  Ibid 77. 
170  Ibid 60-61. See also Caputo Prayers and Tears 200: "Were he [Abraham] to give a reason 
(rationem reddere) for what he is doing, were he to respond to Sarah, to the human 
community, which is the ethically responsible thing to do, he would betray his absolute 
responsibility to God. In the name of his responsibility to God, he cannot be responsible to 
his family and friends." 
171  See Derrida Rogues 48-49, 60, 133; Van der Walt Future and Futurity 102-103 and 115. 
172  See Derrida On Forgiveness 67-68. 
173  See Caputo Against Ethics 274 n 2; Douzinas The End of Human Rights 352. Taken to its 
logical conclusion the relation to the other would lead to the destruction of the self and 
therefore also the destruction of the relation with the other; see Derrida Points 199: "I 
believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the relation to the other 
would be absolutely destroyed, it would be destroyed in advance. The relation to the other 
– even if it remains asymmetrical, open, without possible reappropriation – must trace a 
movement of reappropriation in the image of oneself for love to be possible, for example." 
174  Derrida Gift of Death 64, 95. 
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sacrifice if Abraham was putting to death what he hated. One can sacrifice only 
what one loves. He must, therefore, hate his own insofar as he loves them.175
 
 
My absolute duty and responsibility towards the other, therefore, necessarily 
places at risk my own interests. 
Should we follow Abraham's path – the path of the pure gift, of justice 
(distinguished from law) - or should we remain within the domain of law, 
principles and values as Dyzenhaus proposes? Derrida says that we have to do 
both. Abraham, as we saw, does not calculate, he does not seek to re-
appropriate, he does not economise. He sacrifices his own economy, his home 
(oikos) and self-interest. Abraham gives a pure gift. It is in that moment that the 
other (God) returns Isaac to him, thereby turning Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac 
(which he had essentially completed)176 into an economy – in a sense 
compensating Abraham for his commitment to God, giving a return for 
Abraham's gift.177 It is important to note that it is God who does this, and not 
Abraham. Abraham turns the decision over to the other – it is God who 
effectively decides.178 As Derrida says,179
 
 this does not mean that Abraham 
does nothing; he does everything that has to be done: 
He decides, but his absolute decision is neither guided not controlled 
by knowledge. Such, in fact, is the paradoxical condition of every 
decision: it cannot be deduced from a form of knowledge of which it 
would simply be the effect, conclusion or explication. It structurally 
breaches knowledge and is thus destined to non-manifestation; a 
decision is, in the end, always secret.180
 
 
Abraham is the perfect example, it seems,181
                                            
175  Ibid 64. 
 of what it means to be 
responsible for the other. To heed the call of justice we have to experience the 
176 See Stern 2003 Philosophy Today 40-41 on certain rabbinic interpretations that suggest 
that Isaac was in fact sacrificed. 
177  Derrida Gift of Death 96; Caputo Prayers and Tears 213. 
178  Derrida Points 149; Derrida Gift of Death 71, 96. 
179  Derrida Points 149. 
180  Derrida Gift of Death 77. 
181  It is of course not possible to prove that Abraham did not calculate. In retrospect, it would 
be easy to draw this conclusion; see Derrida ibid 96-97. 
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abyss or the "open mouth" (with all its connotations)182 of incalculable justice. 
To be responsible, we have to take leave of our own subjectivity as well as of 
the shared subjectivity of "our community". We have to act without any thought 
of the consequences to ourselves and "our community". Irrespective of how 
progressive Dyzenhaus' model of review is, we cannot follow him completely if 
we have a true concern for justice. His model does not allow for any disruption 
of common norms, standards of rationality or of (communal) subjectivity. 
Dyzenhaus would have us judge the other without any concern for the 
uninterrupted (although more welcoming, hospitable) collective narcissism 
which is legalised by his conception of justice.183
 
  
 
3.3 Judicial review as giving the perfect gift 
The akedah and the analyses of the concepts of the gift and of justice above 
are of relevance for constitutional decisions, including decisions reviewing 
administrative action. They illustrate not only the infinite demand that justice 
places on a judge in the singular case, but also that judges have no choice but 
to place limitations on that duty in the interests of the preservation of law. 
Dyzenhaus' texts clearly show a concern for justice. This concern is, however, 
for a limited justice that ultimately serves the needs of a particular community. 
Dyzenhaus' concern is expressed in the language of reasonableness and the 
values of the rule of law, which inevitably means that justice will be reduced to 
"our" justice. The other will be judged not as other, but reduced to the same: in 
terms of my knowledge of the other. The rule of law (with its values of liberty, 
equality and human dignity), as described by Dyzenhaus, are likely to give to 
applicants in review proceedings their due - they can have what they demand, 
as long as we, the community,184 regard their claims as reasonable. According 
to Dyzenhaus, as we saw, "reason" (understood in a pragmatic,185
                                            
182  Ibid 84, 86. 
 common law 
manner) is to determine what is due to an applicant. This entails balancing, 
183  Caputo Deconstruction 148-149; Derrida Points 199. 
184  Dyzenhaus Truth, Reconciliation 183 speaks of "a community of free and equal citizens". 
185 See Caputo Against Ethics 117 on the differences between a deconstructive and a 
pragmatic approach. 
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calculation and accounting. The self-serving nature of reason is expressed well 
by Caputo: 
 
The law that reason obeys is reason's own law, so it does not, 
ultimately, finally bend its knee to anything "other" (heteros) but 
offers its respects to itself (autos), like a man bowing to himself in the 
mirror. Even when it honors the Other as an end in itself, it does so 
in virtue of the Law, which is Reason, which is itself; so it respects 
itself as an end in itself.186
 
 
The notions of reason and justification that Dyzenhaus employs thus inevitably 
imply the postulation of  
 
…a universal community of beings who are similar if not identical in 
reason and inclination with the ego.187
 
  
The gift that justice is supposed to be is turned into poison:188
 
 You may receive 
the gift of "justice" as long as your arguments fit into "our" notions of 
reasonableness.  
Western democracies today profess to have a concern with justice, profess 
also, through the existence of the institution of judicial review, that all their 
public acts are justifiable or at least required to be such. What Abraham was 
prepared to do (to commit murder), would have no place in or would be rightly 
condemned in such democracies.189 The question Derrida, however, raises is 
whether we (especially those of us – and I do not exclude myself – who live in 
Western-style liberal democracies with relative ease and comfort) are not all 
complicit in murder "on all the Mount Moriahs of this world"190
                                            
186  Ibid 13. 
 every day in spite 
187  See Douzinas The End of Human Rights 346 on Kantian moral philosophy. See also 
Moyaert Ethiek en het Verlangen 93: "In een bepaald opzicht is het oneerbiedig tegenover 
de ander te zeggen dat ik wat ik doe, enkel doe omdat hij (zij) is zoals alle anderen. Zich 
uitsluitend laten leiden door een voorstelling 'an sich' van het goede betekent dat men 
zowel van het goede als van de ander een soort object maakt. De ander wordt als persoon 
buite spel gezet omdat en voor zover men in zijn plaats meent te weten wat nu eigenlijk 
het goede is voor hem of haar. Het verlangen naar het goede wordt dan in feite 
gereduceerd tot een onpersoonlijke machinerie of een beheersbare calculus." 
188  German: Gift; Afrikaans, Dutch: gif.  
189  Derrida Gift of Death 85. 
190  Ibid 68. 
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of living in a culture of justification. As Derrida points out, these "civilized 
societies", through the structures of the laws of the market, as well as through 
mechanisms of external debt and other such inequities – 
 
puts to death or (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for 
only a minor difference) allows to die of hunger and disease tens of 
millions of children (those neighbours or fellow humans that ethics or 
the discourse of the rights of man refer to) without any moral or legal 
tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, 
the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself. Not only is it 
true that such a society participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it 
actually organizes it. The smooth functioning of its economic, 
political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral 
discourse and good conscience presupposes the permanent 
operation of this sacrifice.191
 
 
Therefore, to claim, as Dyzenhaus does, that liberal democracies are basically 
just, although perhaps not (yet) perfectly so, is a perfect way of ensuring a good 
conscience.192 The requirement of justification as understood by Dyzenhaus 
allows a judge to know where her duty towards the other starts and where it 
ends.193 A judge, Dyzenhaus says, must not, and in applying the notion of 
deference as respect, will not, be guilty of activism or quietism.194 Deference as 
respect, we can say, supposedly allows for a proper balance between freedom 
and constraint.195 Is there not, however, something disconcerting about this 
certainty; this knowing in advance of deciding the case as well as whilst 
deciding the case what the right measure is or will be between economy and 
non-economy?196
                                            
191  Ibid 86. 
 Is this certainty about the middle ground not especially 
disconcerting in light of the self-serving economy of the rule of law? What 
Dyzenhaus attempts to do is to fix the meaning of justifiability in every new 
context where it is to find application and thereby to limit the possibility of 
justice – "justice", he says, should not stray too far from what is currently 
192  See Caputo More Radical Hermeneutics 177-178. 
193  Ibid 60. 
194  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 305. 
195  I take this phrase from an article by Botha 2004 SAJHR 249. 
196  See also Derrida Given Time 63, commenting on Mauss. 
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acceptable in liberal democracies.197 Dyzenhaus, one can say, argues for a 
managed or monitored or domesticated invention: an invention of the same. A 
judge, in judicial review proceedings is "given limited rein or latitude within a 
fixed horizon".198 Every new case is to be treated as not new, but as "lying 
already embedded in the system"; every novelty is reabsorbed.199 The values 
of the community or of society determine the other's fate.200 The other is to be 
made into the image of the community. Does justice not instead require that the 
"community"201 be invented by the other?202
 
  
The values that liberal democracies hold so dear are, of course, to be preferred 
to those prevailing under the Nazi regime and under apartheid.203 Dyzenhaus 
nevertheless relies on natural law principles and an idea of justice which is 
juridically normative or authorised.204 Stated differently, the values that are 
espoused by Dyzenhaus are values of a restricted, self-serving economy, not of 
a general (selfless) economy.205 There is little appreciation of the violence that 
is done to the singular other, by judging her claims and the actions of the 
administration against these values. These liberal democratic values do, 
indeed, sometimes lead to commendable decisions like the one of L'Heureux-
Dubé J in Baker. These values, we should nevertheless not forget, are also 
used (albeit implicitly) to justify keeping millions of starving people outside of 
the borders of South Africa, Canada and other Western democracies.206
 
  
                                            
197  Dyzenhaus Form and Substance 172. 
198  Caputo Prayers and Tears 72. 
199  Ibid. 
200  If we do what Dyzenhaus does, justice, in the words of Derrida Specters of Marx 28 "risks 
being reduced once again to juridical moral rules, norms or representations, within an 
inevitable totalizing horizon (movement of adequate restitution, expiation, or 
reappropriation)". 
201  It would be preferable to speak in this regard of a community-without-community; see Van 
der Walt and Botha 2000 Constellations 350-353.  
202  See Caputo Prayers and Tears 73 on the invention of the I by the other. 
203  These are two of the main contexts with which Dyzenhaus has concerned himself; see 
Dyzenhaus Hard Cases and Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy. 
204  Van der Walt Future and Futurity 126,127. 
205  As Caputo Radical Hermeneutics 245 points out with reference to Nietzsche: values are 
the product of a valuing, willing subject, of the will to power. 
206  See Holtmaat 2005 Filosofie Magazine 15 who points out, with reference to Giorgio 
Agamben, that the right to equality within a nation-state contains the germ of exclusion. 
Equality can be achieved only through the drawing of borders around the nation. 
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To conclude, the identification of certain values or principles that underlie the 
legal order may be a valuable exercise. The action of a judge justifying her 
decision with reference to these values, should not, however be confused with 
justice. To be just, to give a true gift, as we saw above, these values, and 
thereby also the inner morality of law, have to be betrayed. Abraham is 
prepared to sacrifice his only beloved son,  
 
…without calculating, without investing, beyond any perspective of 
recouping the loss; hence, it seems, beyond recompense or 
retribution, beyond economy, without any hope of remuneration.207
 
 
Tying justice to the values of the common law entails a limitation of justice and 
the gift against their dissemination.208 For justice and the gift to be given a 
chance, the circle of time needs to be interrupted in an Abrahamic moment of 
madness (raising the dagger to give death without return).209 This does not 
mean taking a place outside the circle, outside of law, but of interrupting the 
circle, of an openness to the experience of the impossible. This raises the 
question whether it is not essential to build into the notion of justification a 
certain acknowledgement of the inability to fully justify a decision; a certain 
acknowledgement of an inability to properly respond to the other.210
 
  
 
3.4 Democracy and the perfect gift  
As we saw above, Dyzenhaus links his model of review to a theory of 
democracy. Because of his limited conception of justice, Dyzenhaus does not, 
however, detect the internal contradiction in democracy: the need to follow 
rules (to restrict or place limits on equality, freedom, dignity, fairness, 
reasonableness) as well as of doing justice (and, therefore, an equality, 
freedom, dignity, fairness and reasonableness without limit). Dyzenhaus' 
democracy remains, in short, a democratic sovereignty (dēmos and kratos: the 
                                            
207  Derrida Gift of Death 95. 
208  Derrida Given Time 53; Caputo Prayers and Tears 167. 
209  See Caputo Prayers and Tears 162. 
210  Derrida Passions 17. 
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people and power).211 Sovereignty is indeed required to make democracy 
effective, but at the same time it betrays and threatens democracy from the 
outset.212
 
 Through the notion of justification (as well as the principles of 
participation and accountability), Dyzenhaus' democracy returns to the self, this 
democracy being  
…a force in the form of a sovereign authority (sovereign, that is, 
kurios or kuros, having the power to decide, to be decisive, to 
prevail, to have reason over or win out over [avoir raison de] and to 
give the force of law, kuroõ), and thus the power and ipseity of the 
people (dēmos). This sovereignty is a circularity, indeed a sphericity. 
Sovereignty is round; it is a rounding off.213
 
 
A totalitarian tendency can thus be said to continue to exist within Dyzenhaus' 
model of democracy.  
 
Democracy, as Dyzenhaus asserts,214 no doubt requires a commitment to 
substantive equality (and, therefore, possibly, of a recognition of the legitimacy, 
in principle, of the administrative state), but at the same time, it requires a 
responsibility, an infinite responsibility to a justice which does not place any 
limits on equality (such as the notions of formal and even substantive equality 
inevitably do.215
 
 Democracy, understood as linked with justice, can never be 
given perfect expression in the present (through laws, institutions and 
decisions) and it must always remain "to come". Democracy to come insists 
upon  
…the truth of the other, heterogeneity, the heteronomic and the 
dissymmetric, disseminal multiplicity, the anonymous 'anyone', the 
'no matter who,' the indeterminate 'each one'.216
 
  
It leaves open a space "for the other and others to come".217
                                            
211  Derrida Rogues 22. 
 This openness 
necessarily entails danger, but it also opens up administrative law to 
212  Ibid 100. 
213  Derrida Rogues 13. 
214  Dyzenhaus Politics of Deference 306. 
215  Derrida Rogues 38-39, 48-49, 52-53. 
216  Ibid 14-15. 
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acknowledge and confront its own injustices. This "democracy to come" stands 
opposed to a closing off from what or who remains to come, which is 
characteristic of totalitarian systems, but also of Dyzenhaus' democratic theory 
and the notion of reasonable justification. The notion of democracy to come, as 
is the case with other normative concepts, thus also requires invention without 
rule.218 It calls for a suspension of subjectivity as in the akedah where it is not 
Abraham who takes the decision, but the other in him.219 It would indeed be 
undemocratic and irresponsible to be merely democratic and responsible in the 
way Dyzenhaus proposes (justifying one's decisions by calculating).220
 
 
Democracy to come also has a sense of urgency and impatience with present 
injustices in existing democracies which is not present in Dyzenhaus' thinking. 
 
                                                                                                                               
217  Derrida Negotiations 182. 
218  Derrida Passions 9. Democracy to come is closely related to justice and the gift; Derrida 
Rogues 88. As Derrida Roundtable 19 says: "A democracy or a politics that we simply 
calculate, without justice and the gift, would be a terrible thing, and this is often the case."  
219  See also Derrida Politics of Friendship 68-69. Derrida 2000 Constellations 468 has 
explained this notion of decision as follows: "The decision of the other in me means that 
the other who arrives to me is in some sense before me. It does not mean that I have 
someone in me, like a sort of machine, a ventriloquist, who takes action in my place. It 
means that the decision itself corresponds to the other, and that I am myself only from this 
infinite responsibility which the other places in me." 
220  Derrida Passions 9; Derrida Politics of Friendship 69. 
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4 Conclusion 
What does the above mean for Dyzenhaus' model of review, for the notion of 
deference as respect, for reasonable justification, for democracy, for the values 
of equality, dignity and freedom? This article does not argue for the rejection of 
Dyzenhaus' democratic model of judicial review. There can be little doubt that 
Dyzenhaus' democratic model of review is progressive and that it steers clear 
from many of the problems of positivism and of liberalism. I would venture to 
say that it is the best on the market at present. At the same time it remains too 
wedded to the market. Dyzenhaus' criticism of positivism and liberalism is 
entirely apt, although his model ultimately subscribes to similar restrictive 
political views as these theories do. It is too complacent about the values of 
contemporary liberal democracies. Democracy is viewed as a presence. There 
is indeed much of value in the need for reasonable justification (despite its 
proceduralist connotations) and the democratic values that Dyzenhaus 
espouses. The judiciary also inevitably has to be aware, in exercising its review 
jurisdiction, of its "proper" place within a democratic dispensation. It has to 
respect the autonomy of administrative bodies which were tasked by a 
democratic legislature to design or implement policy. Dyzenhaus' notion of 
"deference as respect" gives expression to these important ideas. 
 
This article, nevertheless, calls for a different understanding of the above-
mentioned aspects of Dyzenhaus' model of review, for the recognition that they 
are inscribed within the logic of différance. Dyzenhaus' model, in other words, 
requires refinement. If we have a concern for justice and democracy in 
administrative law, Dyzenhaus' model must be so re-inscribed. It would be 
irresponsible and indeed unjustifiable for a model of review to be called 
"democratic" (with its connotations of justice, whether procedural/substantive or 
both) if it does not seek to urgently address the plight of millions of human 
beings who are effectively homeless and who suffer and die from malnutrition 
and disease, despite the fact that the "administrative" capacity (the technology 
and resources) exists in "established democracies" to eliminate these. A model 
of review which calls itself democratic must similarly enable a vigorous 
resistance to or at least constraining of the implementation of privatisation, 
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deregulation, outsourcing and downsizing insofar as these measures have an 
effect on equality and dignity.221 It would be irresponsible and unjustifiable to, 
when those affected by such measures approach the courts on review, judge 
their pleas simply with reference to "our" democratic values and "our" ideas as 
to the "proper" role of the judiciary in review proceedings in a "democracy". 
Responsibility requires of us to understand justice as incalculable justice, as a 
justice without being limited to values; to understand equality as without limits; 
to understand democracy as always deferred, postponed, put off, and thus 
remaining "to come".222
                                            
221  See in this regard Mullan and Ceddia 2003 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 199. 
 For a decision on review to be a responsible one it 
must, because of différance and like Abraham, pass through an experience of 
the impossible, of an incalculable justice, an expenditure without reserve, 
before daring to conclude that the administrative decision under review is 
"reasonably justifiable". Such a model of review must entail a response to the 
other: "Here I am", before any justification. Such a re-inscription of Dyzenhaus' 
model of review would mean that it no longer belongs to him and to his fellow 
anti-positivist, procedural democrats, but to the other. 
222  Derrida Rogues 35-39. 
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